Facts
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), was indicted before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The information charged her with acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in approving the application for legalization of stay for aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984, despite knowing they were disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens. The Supreme Court had previously upheld the validity of the information against her. While serving as a Senator of the Republic, the prosecution filed a motion for her suspension. On January 25, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution granting the motion, ordering her suspension from her position as Senator and any other government position for ninety (90) days. Petitioner challenged the Sandiganbayan’s authority to impose preventive suspension upon a sitting member of the Senate.
Issues
- Whether the Sandiganbayan has the authority to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent Senator of the Republic of the Philippines who is charged with violating Republic Act No. 3019.
- Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exempts a member of Congress from the mandatory provisions of preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 3019.
Ruling
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the instant petition for certiorari.
The Court ruled that: “Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order“.
Essential Elements of Jurisprudence
The controlling doctrine is that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 mandates the preventive suspension of any incumbent public officer charged under a valid information for specified offenses, including those under RA 3019, regardless of their branch of government or status.
The following legal principles were established or reiterated:
- Mandatory Nature of Suspension: Once the court determines that the information filed under R.A. 3019 is sufficient in form and substance, the court’s duty to issue an order of suspension is ministerial and must be done “as a matter of course”.
- Preventive, Not Punitive: Preventive suspension under R.A. 3019 is not a penalty; it is a preliminary, preventive measure. If the official is acquitted, they are entitled to reinstatement and salaries/benefits lost during the suspension.
- Applicability to All Offices: Section 13 of R.A. 3019 applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which the official stands accused. The law applies equally to appointive or elective officials and permanent or temporary employees.
- No Exemption for Congress: R.A. No. 3019 applies to members of Congress. The doctrine of separation of powers does not shield members of Congress from the sanctions provided in the law.
- Distinction from Congressional Discipline: The suspension under R.A. 3019 is distinct from Congress’s power to discipline its members under the Constitution (Article VI, Section 16(3)). The constitutional provision governs punitive suspension, which cannot exceed sixty days; R.A. 3019 governs preventive suspension, which is not punitive.
- Scope of Pre-Suspension Hearing: In a pre-suspension hearing, the court does not determine the guilt or the strength of the evidence. The accused is only afforded the opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him (e.g., lack of preliminary investigation, or that the facts alleged do not constitute the offense). A challenge to the facts must be limited to inquiring whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.
Sample Q&A
Question: Senator X is currently facing trial before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Sandiganbayan has issued an order suspending Senator X from his office for ninety (90) days pending the trial. Senator X argues that this suspension is invalid because Article VI, Section 16(3) of the 1987 Constitution limits the penalty of suspension imposed on a member of Congress to sixty (60) days. Is the Sandiganbayan’s order valid, and what is the core rationale for the distinction between the two forms of suspension?
Answer: Yes, the Sandiganbayan’s order is valid. The Supreme Court has established that Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude members of Congress from its coverage. Pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, any incumbent public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information is pending shall be suspended from office.
The core rationale for upholding the 90-day judicial suspension despite the constitutional limit is the fundamental difference between the nature and purpose of the two suspensions. The sixty-day limit in Article VI, Section 16(3) of the 1987 Constitution applies to a punitive measure imposed by Congress upon an erring member for disorderly behavior. Conversely, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a preliminary, preventive measure. It is not a penalty and is imposed as a matter of ministerial duty by the court once the validity of the information is determined. The doctrine of separation of powers does not exempt legislators from these judicial sanctions imposed by general anti-graft laws.
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